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ABSTRACT 
LIMITATIONS OF ALMP IN KOREA 
 
By 
 
Taek-Soon SONG 
 
     Facing with economic crises, Korean governments have designed and implemented a 
series of economic reforms in the financial, corporate and product market as well as labor 
market.  
     Whereas such reforms alleviated much of economic burden, however, they caused 
labor market dualism and income polarization, leading to worsened inequality and social 
conflict. 
     Recognizing such problems, this paper analyzes the history and the current status of 
Korean labor market, especially its active labor market policies (ALMP) from the 
perspective of flexicurity theory and transitional labor markets (TLM) theory.   
     Superficially, Korean labor market seems to be in a balanced flexicurity state. 
Nonetheless, while the labor force continuously undergoes transitions, ALMP, which is one 
of the most important factors that support flexicurity and transitions of labor force, is not far 
from being efficient. In particular, there is much room for enhancement in terms of targeting, 
monitoring, and evaluation of ALMP.  
     Institutional change is required in terms of enlarged spending, efficient 
implementation, systematic comprehensive monitoring and evaluation of ALMP for 
attaining a desirable state of employability of labor force and for achieving sustained growth 
based on social cohesion.   
 
Key words: Korean labor market, flexicurity, TLM, ALMP
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I. INTRODUCTION 
     For the past several decades, Korea has advanced far in its growth and socio-
economic development, and on June 23 2012, the Korean Government declared that Korea 
became a member of the so-called "20-50 club" whose member countries have at least 
U$20,000 per-capita GDP, and population of 50 million. According to the MOSF (Ministry 
of Strategy and Finance), "Korea is the seventh country that has satisfied the two criteria, 
the first country that was not an industrialized before WWII, and that has achieved this".1  
     In spite of the foreign currency crisis of 1997 and the global financial crisis of 2008, 
the average annual GDP growth was more than 4% for the past decade. Unemployment and 
government debt have been kept low as well. However, the potential growth rate is 
projected to fall, in part due to decreasing productivity, and to rapid population ageing. 
Other problems have also been arising. Among them, income inequality is most serious and 
getting worse due to factors such as labor market dualism. Relative poverty rate and Gini 
coefficient have been growing, while social safety net is not strong, and social cohesion is 
being endangered (OECD 2012a). 
     Globally, the European financial crisis and the delayed economic recovery of the US 
are withholding Korea's economic growth. Domestically, dwindling domestic demand, 
diminished investment, increased household debt and unemployment of the young 
generation are persistently problematic (NABO 2012). 
     Such problems imply that the reform measures taken by the recent Korean 
Governments were insufficient and incomplete. In particular, welfare and labor-market 
reforms failed to completely overcome the impact of the globalization and the shocks from 
                                                          
1) The Korea Times, June 23, 2012. The other 6 countries are Japan (1987), USA (1988), France (1990), Italy (1990), 
Germany (1991), and the Great Britain (1996). The per-capita income of these 6 countries increased up to over U$30,000 
in later years. 
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the 1997 foreign currency crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis. Indeed, "in contrast to 
the significant progress in the corporate and financial sectors, labor market reforms are 
lagging and the institutional framework is poorly adapted to the rapidly changing economy" 
(Jones 2005, 4).  
     Having recognized such problems, this paper reviews the history, current status, and 
problems of the Korean labor-market. In particular, its major focus is set on the ALMP 
(Active labor Market Policies), which is an important factor of flexicurity theory and TLM 
(Transitional labor Markets) theory. To be more specific, this paper ultimately tries to verify 
whether there are proper and systematic overall targeting, monitoring, and evaluation 
system with regard to ALMP in Korea. 
     This paper is organized as follows: Section II presents theoretical framework, namely 
flexicurity, TLM, and ALMP. Section III provides overview of Korean labor market. Section 
IV delves into the problems in the current regime, Section V presents some discussion and 
issues, and Section VI, as conclusion, summarizes the paper and proposes feasible solutions 
and policy recommendations.  
 
II. Theoretical Framework 
      In the analysis of labor market policies,2 recent attention has been paid to the 
flexicurity theory and TLM theory both of which put much emphasis on ALMP. For 
instance, the Korean Government officially lists "increasing the flexicurity of the labor 
market" as one of its economic challenges (MOSF 2011c, 7), and the Korea Labor Institute 
conducted a thorough study on TLM (KLI 2011) as an important labor market model. 
Accordingly, this paper utilizes the two theories and the ALMP concept for the analysis, 
                                                          
2) "Labor market policies can be defined as a system of policies, developed by governments in order to solve or 
diminish basic labor market problems, dealing with such matters as human resource development, vocational training, job 
placement, income insurance for the unemployed, and policies for foreign workers” (Inagami 1998, 1).  
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diagnosis, and prescription with regard to Korean labor market policies. Review of the 
history and status of the Korean labor market policies, which is covered in Chapter III, is 
included as analytical background to show that not much emphasis has been laid on TLM 
and ALMP aspect. 
 
A. Flexicurity Theory 
     "Flexicurity is the combination of flexibility and security". In the labor-market 
dynamics, it deals with "the nexus between the [employers'] capacity to adapt the workforce 
to changes in the economy and the [workers'] capacity to maintain working and living 
conditions" (Vandenberg 2008, iii). 
     The concept was first advocated by Wilthagen, a Dutch economist. He argued that the 
full employment does not guarantee 'social inclusion', and flexicurity can include workers in 
insecure and precarious situations (Wilthagen 1998, 21) 
     Later, the Kok Report suggested balancing between flexibility and security as a policy 
guideline for the EU members, by emphasizing that "a high degree of flexibility in labor 
markets ... can only succeed if combined with adequate security for workers" (Kok 2003b, 
27).3 
    Wilthagen and Tros define flexicurity as follows: 
                                                          
3) The report went on to propose the following measures: 
a) examine and, where necessary, adjust the level of flexibility provided under standard contracts, to ensure 
their attractiveness for employers and workers, 
b) review the role of other forms of contracts with a view to providing more options for employers and 
employees depending on their needs, 
c) ensure there is adequate security for workers under all forms of contracts and prevent the emergence of 
two-tier labor markets, 
d) remove obstacles to the setting up and development of temporary work agencies as effective and 
attractive intermediaries in the labor market, offering improved job opportunities and high employment 
standards, 
e) promote the use of ICT [information and communication technology] and working time flexibility as 
tools to modernize work organization,  
f) remove obstacles to, and raise the attractiveness of, part-time work for employers and workers, 
g) adapt social protection systems to support mobility in the labor market and facilitate transitions between 
different statuses, such as work, training, career breaks or self-employment (job-to-job insurance).  
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A policy strategy that attempts, synchronically and in a deliberate way, to enhance the 
flexibility of labor markets, work organization and labor relations on the one hand, and 
to enhance security – employment security and social security – notably for weaker 
groups in and outside the labor market, on the other hand (Wilthagen and Tros 2004, 
169). 
     
Flexibility can be divided into four forms (Wilthagen et al. 2003, 4): 
1) External numerical flexibility: the flexibility of hiring and firing 
2) Internal numerical flexibility: working hours, overtime, part-time, etc. 
3) Functional flexibility: multi-employability, flexible organization of work 
4) Wage flexibility: performance or result-based pay 
 
Likewise, security can take four forms: 
1) Job security: the certainty of retaining a specific job with a specific employer 
2) Employment security/employability security: the certainty of remaining in work 
(not necessarily with the same employer) 
3) Income security: income protection in the event that paid work ceases 
4) Combination security: the certainty of being able to combine paid work with other 
social responsibilities and obligations. 
 
     To look at it from a trade-off relationship, there can be many states that are 
combinations of the eight forms (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Flexibility and security trade-offs 
 
Source: Wilthagen and Tros (2004, 171) 
 
Flexicurity has 4 policy components of 1) Flexible and reliable contractual 
arrangements, 2) Comprehensive lifelong learning strategies, 3) Effective active labor 
market policies, and 4) Modern social security systems. These components can support 
mutually and can improve employment, poverty condition, and human capital (European 
Commission 2007, 5). 4 
                                                          
4) As a guideline for implementing flexicurity policies, 8 common principles (European Commission 2007, 9), and 4 
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     In its essence, flexicurity is about transitions, about addressing segmentation, and 
about developing new securities, and the flexicurity model calls for such labor market 
policies that attend to such flexicurity aspect. 
 
B. TLM Theory 
     Interestingly, TLM was also initiated at the similar time in the same country as 
Wilthagen’s, Netherlands. Schmid (1998) proposed TLM as an element to solve the 
employment crisis in Europe at the time. 
     TLM theory was based on the recognition that 1) the traditional notion of full 
employment is outdated and unachievable, 2) the growing number of pensioners is depleting 
social security systems (Schmid 1998, 4), and 3) there is a "double evolution of workers' 
trajectories" (Gazier 2009, 14).   
     TLM is defined as "institutionalized arrangements which allow or support the change 
of the employment status or the combination of labor market work with other socially (and 
to some extent even economically) useful activities" (Schmid 1998, abstract). 
The aim of TLM theory is to provide “a consistent framework to give flexicurity a 
clear direction and principles” (Schmid 2009, 2). Specifically, it looks to providing 
consistent normative and analytical principles for the deliberate combinations that 
flexicurity components can follow. 
     "As a normative concept, TLM theory redefines the social dimension of the labor 
market by focusing on social solidarity through ex ante risk sharing instead of only 
compensating ex post the losers of market dynamics through transfers." The normative 
perspective captures 4 justices, namely 1) fairness, 2) solidarity, 3) agency [institutional 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
pathways (European Commission 2007, 28-35) are defined. Even though these principles and pathways were originally 
intended for EU members, they might be applicable to other nations including Korea. 
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capacity building], and 4) inclusion (Schmid 2009, 7). 
     "As an analytical concept, TLM theory emphasizes the dynamics of labor markets. 
The analytical focus is on flows between different employment relationships rather than on 
stocks, and on transitions" over the following 5 critical events over the life-course (Schmid 
2009, 11):  
1) Transitions from school to work or between education and employment over the 
life-course 
2) Transitions between jobs or various employment relationships  
3) Transitions between employment and unemployment 
4) Transitions between (unpaid) private household activities and gainful work 
5) Transitions from employment to retirement 
     Each of these categories entails specific risks of 1) low earnings, 2) income volatility, 
3) restricted earnings, and 4) reduced or zero earnings (Schmid 2009, 12). Accordingly, 
TLM theory provides means of managing these risks and calls for the establishment of 
"institutional arrangements that transform risks from danger to trust" (Schmid 2009, 29-30). 
     In summary, TLM theory proposes to reform, improve, and create markets, and its 
target is to emphasize and confirm overall re-embedding process of the labor market (Gazier 
2009, 16).  
 
C. Flexicurity vs. TLM 
     Flexicurity and TLM can be viewed as complement to each other. The flexicurity 
theory claims that it might define more precisely and accurately the conditions under which 
labor markets can become truly transitional. In some way, flexicurity can be considered as 
an implementation strategy for TLM (Wilthagen 1998, 23). 
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Table 2. Nexus between flexibility and security 
 
Source: Schmid (2004, 5)  
     On the other hand, TLM theory argues that flexicurity theory lacks consistency and 
can lead to opportunistic usage for various contradicting political interests. Especially, the 
nexus between flexibility and security (Table 2) is not always a trade-off because many 
combinations could produce virtuous or vicious cycles (Schmid 2004, 5). 
     One of the common aspects of these two theories is that they both underline the need 
for effective ALMP as measures to enhance flexicurity and to help transitions.   
     Since flexicurity could be an implementation strategy for TLM, while TLM theory 
provides a framework to complement the flexicurity theory, these two theories, if mixed 
together, might become a TLM Flexicurity Model. 
D. ALMP 
     ALMP can be defined as transferring payments for participation in training or job 
creation programs (while passive policies transfer payments for willingness to job search 
only), and its objective is labor market integration through better employability (Auer 2005, 
5). 
     ALMP can facilitate overcoming transitional situations "by providing supportive 
institutional environment" (Schmid 1998, 9). ALMP is "essential to tap the potential of the 
workforce", and to prevent workforce from becoming detached from the labor market, 
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especially in economic downturns and during restructuring period (Kok 2003b, 36).  
     "ALMP, rather than passive labor market policies, has increasingly been promoted in 
the OECD countries and transition economies as a principal means to deal with 
unemployment" (Pierre 1999, Foreword).  In general, structural change should be 
accompanied by active labor market policies which are linked to other policies (Inagami 
1998, 2). In effect, "OECD countries have sought to raise labor utilization especially by 
cutting labor taxes, delaying effective retirement ages, reforming disability schemes and 
strengthening ALMP" (OECD 2012a). 
    While ALMP measures include targeted employment subsidies, and job search 
assistance such as face-to-face interviews, individual action plans and job clubs (OECD 
2012b), it is useful to refer to the measures proposed by the Kok report to see what 
constitute ALMP (Kok 2003b, 36): 
1) Offer personalized services to all unemployed and job-seekers at an early stage: 
guidance, training or new job opportunities. 
2) Improve the efficiency of activation programs by identifying the real needs of job-
seekers and by providing tailor-made measures. 
 3) Develop rapid response schemes in the event of plant closures or large scale 
company restructuring: counseling, retraining and placement. 
4) Equip employment services so that they can deliver tailor-made services and 
strengthen local partnerships for employment. 
5) Address the specific needs of the most vulnerable, including disadvantaged young 
people and people with disabilities. 
      
ALMP is important because they have various socio-economic functions (Auer 2005, 
5-6): 
1) Matching functions 
- Public employment/reemployment service, job search assistance, prospecting 
vacancies, labor market information, profiling 
   - Enhancing labor supply: training, retraining  
2) Other functions: 
- Prevention of job loss 
- Formalize informal work 
- Income/employability provision to jobless and underemployed  
- Contribution to social integration and cohesion 
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     ALMP works well under the following environment (Auer 2005, 13):  
1) Well-targeted measures: good profiling of participants and programs. 
2) Real-work place situations experience 
3) Association of private sector: private-public partnership 
4) Organizational capacities: function of new intermediaries 
5) Public work schemes 
6) Combined measures: e.g., training and public works 
7) Proper timing of measures 
 
III. KOREAN labor MARKET 
     This section reviews overall employment condition of Korea, and economic reforms 
and policies of the recent Korean Governments to abstract their common characteristics, and 
then focuses on their policies that are causal to the engendering of the recent social 
discontent.  
 
A. Macroeconomic Overview 
  1. Growth and employment 
     In Korea, employment continuously grew at a quite rapid rate, and "such rapid 
employment growth was mainly due to the historic speed of economic growth", even though 
employment growth tended to slow down over time (Ann 2010). 
In terms of growth, Korean economy recorded an unprecedentedly high growth before 
the 1997 crisis, and the average annual growth rate between 1970 and 1996 was 7.9 percent. 
During the period, as the average annual growth rate of employment exceeded the average 
annual growth rate of working age population, the economy enjoyed near full-employment, 
with the record high employment rate of 60.9% in 1997. 
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Table 3. Employment trend5 
(Unit: 1,000 persons, %) 
Year GDP (billion won) Employed Unemployed WAP* Employment rate** 
1970 61,851 9,617 445 17,468 55.1 
1979 148,715 13,602 540 23,787 57.2 
1988 316,245 16,869 435 29,602 57.0 
1996 578,186 20,853 426 34,274 60.8 
1997 611,529 21,214 556 34,851 60.9 
1998 576,587 19,938 1,461 35,347 56.4 
2002 642,748 22,169 752 36,963 60.0 
2007 773,868 23,433 783 39,170 59.8 
2008 978,499 24,347 769 39,598 59.5 
2009 981,625 23,506 889 40,092 58.6 
2010 1,043,666 23,829 920 40,590 58.7 
2011 1,081,594 24,244 855 41.052 59.1 
GDP: Market price Gross Domestic Production 
WAP: Working age population (aged 15 or older) 
Emp rate: Employment rate = (Emp/WAP)×100 
Source: Ann (2010), Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System, and Korean Statistical Information 
Service (KOSIS) 
 
Figure 1. Trend of employment rate 
 
Source: MOEL (2011) Employment & labor White Paper 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5) Selection of the years are based on such critical occasions as the 1979 oil shock, the 1988 Seoul Olympics, the 1997 
Asian financial crisis, the 2002 World Cup, and the 2008 global crisis. For more details of population and employment 
trend for the period of 2001-2011, see Appendix A, and Appendix B. 
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Table 4. Average annual growth of GDP and employment 
(Unit: %) 
Period GDP Employed Unemployed WAP* Employment rate 
1970-79 8.3 3.93 2.17 3.49 0.24 
1979-88 7.7 2.42 -2.37 2.46 -0.02 
1988-96 7.7 2.69 -0.23 1.85 0.48 
1996-02 4.3 1.03 7.36 1.27 -0.14 
2002-07 4.4 1.12 0.81 1.17 -0.03 
2008-11 3.5 0.86 2.56 1.18 -0.29 
Source: Ann (2010), BOK Economic Statistics System, and KOSIS 
The 1997 foreign exchange crisis, however, plummeted down economic indicators: 
"the economic growth rate plunged to minus 6.9 percent, and the employment growth rate, 
to minus 6.0 percent". Consequently, the unemployment rate hit the record-high 7.0 percent. 
The unemployment "more than doubled" to 1.5 million in 1998. After the crises, even 
though the economy recovered itself quite fast, economic growth and employment growth 
remained low. The total employment rate of 59.8 percent of 2007 was still lower than that 
(60.9) of 1997 (MOEL 2011).  
     The Korean economy was hit hard once again by the global financial crisis of 2008. 
The economic growth rate of 2008 was merely 2.3%, which dropped further to 0.3% in 2009. 
Accordingly, the unemployment rate also increased to 3.2% in 2008. This time, as well, 
Korean economy recovered itself relatively rapidly, attaining economic growth of 6.2% in 
2010. But the recovery was, in most part, due to the large-scale fiscal deficit of 43.2 trillion 
Won in 2009, 30.2 trillion Won in 2010, and 25.3 trillion Won in 2011. The ratio of fiscal 
deficit to GDP was 1.5% in 2008, but it was 4.1% in 2009. Nevertheless, the economic 
recovery slowed down in 2011 with only 3.6% GDP growth (NABO 2012; BAI 2012). 
     Growth forecasts are also gloomy. While the administrative government expects 
annual growth of 4.5% to continue until 2015, NABO (National Assembly Budget Office) 
forecasts it to be 3.8%, based on expected waning of domestic demand due to such factors 
as household debt restructuring and slow recovery of employment.  
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     OECD's estimate of the annual potential growth of Korea is still lower. Korea’s 
potential growth slows down because labor productivity falls, and because working-age 
population growth gets sluggish. "Its potential growth rate per capita is projected to 
decelerate from around 4% during the current decade to around 2¼ per cent during the 
2030s" (OECD 2012a). 
     Table 5 well captures the trend of decreasing GDP growth and the lowering 
employment elasticity of Korean economy, which raises question about sustained 
development in terms of growth and employability (Keum 2012, 2). 
Table 5. GDP, job Creation and employment elasticity by government 
 
Source: Keum (2012, 2) 
  2. Population ageing 
    As Figure 2 clearly illustrates, Korean population has been increasingly ageing: 
Population of 14 years or younger is shrinking, while that of 65 years or older is expanding, 
which leads to the rapid growth of ageing index (27 in 1996, 36 in 2001, 51 in 2006, and 73 
in 2011).6  
  
                                                          
6) Ageing index = (population of age 65 or older)/(population of age 14 or younger)×100 
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Figure 2. Ageing trend in Korea 
(Population unit: 1,000) 
 
- Source: KOSIS 
 
Figure 3. Forecasts of ageing in Korea  
Note: 
Old-age dependency ratio = (population of age 65 or older)/(population of age 15-64) × 100  
Source: KNSO (2006), recited from Moon (2009, 1) 
     Ageing problem is forecasted to get worse in the coming years, and OECD (2012a) 
warns that "Korea faces the most rapid population ageing in the OECD area. Indeed, Korea, 
which currently has the third-youngest population, will have the second oldest by 2050". 
Figure 3 well depicts this forecast. 
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B. Historical Overview 
     Scholars vary in their views on the development of the Korean economy, politics, and 
welfare systems in terms of transformations. For instance, Yoon (2008, 3) counts 4 major 
transformations: mid 1970s, mid to late 1980s, mid 1990s, and between late 1990s and early 
2000s.7 This paper focuses on two phases of reforms: 1) reforms in the globalization period, 
and 2) post-crisis reforms.   
  1. Industrialization Period 
     The main tenet of the Korean industrial policies of the 1960s was "guided capitalist 
system" embodied in the 5-year Economic Development Plans by which the government 
intervened in various socio-economic sectors.8 
     In its essence, the high growth of the earlier phase of Korean development was in line 
with the "state's intervention" which took the form of "industrial policies" that protected 
domestic industries, developed strategic industries, and adjusted the economic structure to 
changes (Johnson 1982). 
     Amsden's analysis of late industrialization process of Korea also identified the system 
as the developmental statism. In particular, she found the cause of the Korean success of late 
industrialization in the state's support for chaebols, and the discipline that corresponded with 
the support (Amsden 1989). 
    Overall, the period of 1963-1975 was "a great employment expansion period" when 
workforce was supplied unlimitedly from the rural sector or the underemployed people in 
                                                          
7) For the details, see Appendix C.  
8) The 1st 5-year plan explicitly stated, as its basic objectives, that 1) to correct all socio-economic vicious circles, 2) on 
the basis of the liberal enterprise principle that respects freedom and creativity of the private actors, to maintain "guided 
capitalist system" in which the government directly involves in or indirectly uses guiding policies with regard to 
infrastructure sector and other importance sectors, and 3) focusing on the public sector to which the government can affect 
with direct policy measure, to seek activities that affect the private sector and to stimulate spontaneous activities of the 
private sector. See KDI (Korea Development Institute), Half-century Korean Economy (Seoul: KDI, 2003), 203, for the full 
text. 
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the urban informal sector. However, employment growth rate slowed down in the 1970s, 
and the unlimited labor supply began to be exhausted since 1975 (Cheon 1999, 6-7). 
    Pushed by the developmental initiatives, the Park Jung Hee government and the Chun 
Doo Hwan government pursued "restrictive new labor laws" and policies to reduce unions 
and their activities, "to discourage unwanted wage hikes and labor disputes". Nonetheless, 
"in return for these sacrifices of long hours, low pay, and limited labor rights, Korean 
workers received ... the implicit benefit of lifetime employment security" (Kitt 2003, 2).  
    One of the security measures for the workers was the Industrial Accident 
Compensation Insurance which was "established as the nation's first social insurance in 
1964" (Kim Yeon Myung 2006, 9). At the same time, however, "the government suppressed 
any independent labor movement", and during the 1960s and 1970s labor law was often 
amended to restrict union activities. For instance, in 1972 labor legislation was revised to 
stifle unions, and to prohibit strikes (Lee et al. 2001).  
     During the mid-1980s, "the government shifted its policy from labor market 
repression to liberalization”. The 1987 labor law amendments "allowed formation of unions, 
limited the interference of government in dispute resolution and arbitration, and enforced 
minimum wage". But the effect was devastating. During the period from July 1987 to June 
1989, the number of unions almost tripled, and the number of union members almost 
doubled, which led to large number of strikes: There arose 3,600 strikes only during the 
second half of 1987, and 1n 1987, about 70 percent of manufacturing firms with 1,000 
workers or more experienced strikes (Lee Chung H. 2005, 9).  
     On the employers' part, however, need for labor flexibility emerged for maintaining 
competitiveness in the international markets. Consequently, in 1989, massive layoffs were 
legitimized.9  
                                                          
9) Dismissal required judicial orders on such condition as a) only in managerial urgency, b) after all efforts 
 16 
 
     Meanwhile, the National Health Insurance, which became effective in 1977, and 
initially covered firms with 500 employees or more, was extended to accomplish universal 
health coverage in 1989. Another major social insurance, namely the National Pension 
Scheme, mandatorily covered firms with 50 employees or more in 1988 (Kim, Yeon Myung 
2006, 5-6). 
     With such basic social safety nets, the developmental statism worked quite nicely, and 
with the economic development model of export-oriented industrialization, Korea 
"successfully entered the world economy" (Hwang and Lim 2003, 230). However, the 
developmental state began to malfunction in the face of external and internal challenges 
during the 1980s and 1990s:10 
     The faulted dirigiste state was displaying “a good many signs of malfunction even 
before the Asian crisis, as it was caught in the cross-current of two challenges: (1) demands 
of the global market for further liberalization, deregulation, and competitiveness of the 
nation’s industries and (2) rising pressures to reduce market-generated inequity from an 
increasingly vociferous society, especially the labor force” (Park 2001, 67). 
  2. Globalization and Reforms 
     After the democratization, the first civilian administration under President Kim Young 
Sam incrementally liberalized the economy, mainly for two reasons: 1) it wanted to gain 
legitimacy from the international community such as the OECD and the WTO, and 2) it 
wanted to differentiate itself from the developmental role of the military regime (Kim, 
Minjae 2011, 3-4).  
     The Kim Young-sam government's liberalization and internationalization policies 
included relaxation of labor regulations (Chan 2006). The Employment Insurance System 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
were made, c) prior consultation with union or representatives of workers, and 4) fair and equitable layoff 
procedure.  
10) For further details of the challenges that East Asian developmental states were facing, see Joseph Wong, "The 
Adaptive Developmental State in East Asia", Journal of East Asian Studies 4 (2004), 345-362. 
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(EIS) was implemented in 1995 to facilitate smooth reforms.  The Labor Standards Act 
was modified on December 26, 1995 which eliminated the need for court orders with regard 
to dismissals.11 
     The new law aroused protests, and huge strikes broke out, led by the Korean 
Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) and the Federation of Korean Trade Unions 
(FKTU). In response to such protests, the law was revised again in March 1997. The 
revision was to improve basic labor rights for the improvement of workers’ welfare, and to 
enhance flexibility in the labor market for the enhancement of business competitiveness. 
The legislation allowed multiple unions for workers, but at the same time legalized layoffs 
for businesses. In addition, flexible working hours system was also stipulated (Lee et al. 
2000, 12) 
     With the democratic politics in place, government-business ties began to take on a 
new character and received more scrutiny from labor and civil society. Industrial policies 
and "the discretionary power of developmental state was further eroded in the early 
nineties" (Doucette 2009, 13).   
  3. Post-crisis Reforms  
     The 1997 crisis occurred due to the consequences of “Korea’s unprepared, premature 
liberalization and foreign investors’ irrational exuberance for the Korean market" (Park 
2001, 70). With the $58 billion loan from the IMF, the Korean government was forced to 
conduct reforms ranging from corporate governance to labor laws.  
     The post-crisis labor market reform mainly aimed to improve labor market flexibility 
to carry out the IMF-mandated restructuring. On February 6, 1998, the Tripartite 
                                                          
11) This new legislation also required some preconditions such as 1) before layoffs, prior consultation with worker's is 
needed at least 60 days in advance,  and 2) larger firms require prior permission from the labor Committee for mass 
layoffs. 
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Commission reached a Tripartite Agreement.12 Based on the agreement, against strong 
opposition by labor, on February 13, the new labor law was approved, which allowed 
redundancy layoffs and eased the hiring of irregular, temporary, and substitute workers 
during strikes (Lee, Chung H. 2005, 13).13 
     In addition, the Act Regarding Protection of Dispatched Workers was enacted in 
1998,14 which consequently resulted in the increase of non-regular jobs. Moreover, the rapid 
expansion of public works also increased the number of part-time and temporary workers. 
By 1999, “the non-regular workers was accounted for more than 50 per cent” of the regular 
workers (Chan 2006). 
     When the crisis had deepened, the Kim Dae Jung Government perceived the need for 
reinforcing social safety net, and declared the "productive welfare" as one of the three pillars 
of the Government including market economy and democracy (Lee, Hye Kyung 2005, 1).   
     Under the flag of the "productive welfare", the "five big social reforms" were 
vigorously pursued: the extension of the National Pension System; the establishment of the 
National Health Insurance System; the forming of the Tripartite Commission; the expansion 
of Employment Insurance System; and the enactment of the National Basic Livelihood 
Security Law15 (Park 2010, 11).  
     In 2000, the Minimum Wage Law was amended to benefit all work-places, and the 
Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance, which started in 1964, became available in all 
work places. In 2001, daily workers became eligible for unemployment insurance. The 
government also reinforced employment training and job placement services, and 
                                                          
12) For the core contents of the agreement, see Appendix D. 
13) This time, the preconditions for layoffs included, 1) for urgent managerial needs, such as transfer, merge or 
acquisition of business to avoid financial difficulties; 2) with prior efforts to avoid layoffs, and a fair and rational standard 
should be applied for layoffs; and 3) with prior consultation with unions, at the notice of 60 days in advance. (Article 31, 
labor Standards Act). 
14) In 26 occupations which are deemed to require special knowledge, skills, and experience, it is allowed to use 
"dispatched workers" up to two years, and such used of dispatched workers can be extended for another year upon 
agreement between management and employees. 
15) The law superseded the Livelihood Protection Act of 1961.  
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established Job Centers nationwide. 
     The Tripartite Commission formed the Special Committee on Measures for Non-
regular Workers, reached the Social Pact for Job Creation in 2003, and entered into the 
Agreement on Vocational Training for SMEs and Non-regular Workers in March 2005.  
     The Noh government established an "overall measures regarding youth 
unemployment in 2003, and "overall measures for job-creation", and concluded the 
Tripartite Social Pact in 2004 for creating jobs and increasing employment rate (MOL 2005, 
3).  
     For the protection of non-standard workers, the Noh government proposed the Act on 
the Protection of Fixed Term and Part-time Employees,16 and a revision of the Act on the 
Protection of Dispatch Employees in November 2004. In the end, the Act on the Protection 
of Non-regular Workers was enacted in November 2006. 
  4. Recent Policies 
     Facing the economic crisis of 2008, the Lee Myung Bak government formed an 
"Emergency Economy Government" in January 2009, and sought for economic boosting 
and job creation (MOSF 2009, 4). 
     The policy achievements in the labor and welfare area in the 2008-2009 period were 1) 
supporting "job-sharing" through tax measures, 2) seeking employment security of the 
vulnerable class through the Youth-intern System, and the Hope Labor (public-works), 3) 
pursuing livelihood stability of the vulnerable class through Livelihood Relief, and 
Emergency Welfare, and 4) fortifying of working-class-friendly policies through "micro-
financing" and the Bogeumjari (cozy nest) Housing (MOSF 2009, 5).  
                                                          
16) The Act mainly stipulated the following: 
a) Unjustifiable discriminatory practices are prohibited. 
b) For hiring fixed-term and part-time workers, written contracts must be established. 
c) The maximum duration of a fixed-term contract is three years. 
d) Overtime work by part-time employees is limited to 12 hours a week. 
e) Use of temporary agency workers is allowed to all occupations.  
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     By 2011, the current government achieved some advancement of industrial relations, 
and expansion of open employment through such measures as implementation of multiple 
unions, the execution of the Overall Measures regarding Non-regular Workers, and 
extending 40-hours-per-week scheme to businesses having less-than-20 employees (MOSF 
2011, 6). 
     Also the government established a framework for the Welfare for Work, and the 
Customized Welfare. The income criterion for the Earned Income Tax Credit was raised to 
17 million won per year and its payment was increased up to 1.2 million won. The burden of 
the National Pension contribution and Employment Insurance premium was lessened by 
one-third for both petty employers and low-wage (120% or less of the minimum wage) 
workers. In addition, the Basic Old-age Pension and the Farm-land Pension both increased 
their number of beneficiaries and the amount of benefit (MOSF 2011a, 7). 
     In the labor area, the Lee Myung Bak government dealt with the industrial conflict 
based on law and principles, which lead to the decrease of labor-management disputes, and 
hence the labor loss days. In the welfare area, it expanded various subsidies and benefits. 
However such policies as the Senior Long-term Recuperation Scheme, and the Basic Old-
age Pension had already been instituted during the Noh Moo Hyun Government (Kim, Shi-
jeong 2010, 2).  
     Overall, in response to the new social risks such as low birth, ageing, and polarization, 
the government has expanded fiscal expenditure on health, welfare, and labor at the average 
annual growth of 9.7% (MOSF 2011b, 90).17 
     The main directions of the labor and welfare policy of 2011-2015 are 1) strengthening 
“work-welfare connection” for the support of escape from poverty through work, 2) 
expending “custom-made” welfare for the low-income vulnerable class, 3) executing the 
                                                          
17) Welfare spending by year (trillion won): 2007, 61.4; 2008, 67.7; 2009, 74.6; 2010, 81.2, and 2011, 86.4. 
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Basic Plan against Low-birth and Ageing, 4) fortifying the competitiveness of health-
medical industry and expanding public health service, and 5) preventing budget leakage 
through the improvement of welfare delivery system (MOSF 2011b, 91-92). 
  5. Characteristics of the Reforms18 
     Kim Dae Jung Government's economic reform showed the features of regulatory 
(neo-liberal) state of crisis management as well as the characteristics of former 
developmental state (Kim, In Young 2011). In addition, it had the characteristics of 
"institutional isomorphism" due to exogenous events and their internal and external 
pressures, and it was a hybrid of neo-liberalism and developmentalism (Goo 2011). Indeed, 
the "stickiness of unreconstructed strong statism persisted", and "the state failed to enhance 
the status of labor and productivity" (Park 2001, 64). 
     The Noh Moo Hyun government can be characterized as both a regulatory (regulating 
chaebols with the Monopoly Regulation and the Fair Trade Act), and a developmental 
(increasing the competitiveness of Korean economy by pursuing FTAs). 
     Whereas the Kim Dae Jung Government adopted neo-liberalism reluctantly, the Lee 
Myung Bak Government voluntarily adopted the same ideology. However, the Lee Myung 
Bak Government cannot be said to have fully adopted the neo-liberalism as well (Goo 2011).  
     Under the strong developmental state, the welfare and labor system also evolved into 
taking developmental characteristics. Accordingly, Holliday (2000) categorized Korean 
welfare system as a "productivist welfare regime" that has a developmental-universalist 
characteristic (Holliday 2000).19  
     
                                                          
18) For the historical overview of Korean social insurance and welfare system, see Appendix E.  
19) According to Holliday (2000), "a productivist world of welfare capitalism needs to be added to Esping-Andersen's 
conservative, liberal and social-democratic worlds. Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan can all be 
placed in that world." 
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     He concludes that the Korean welfare system is "a rather pure form of developmental-
universalism, because the Public Assistance Program provides no more than a very basic 
universal safety net, and all other programs cover only those who have paid into them". 
Kwon (2002, 4) also admits that "Holliday is certainly right in emphasizing that the 
developmental state always placed policy priority on economic development and that social 
policy was only considered in that context." 
     In support of this view, Kim (2009) also defines the Korean welfare system as a 
productive welfare state.20 Indeed, many scholars have thought of the Korean economic 
transition as path dependent on developmental statism that once contributed much to the 
development and modernization of Korea. For example, Goo (2011) argues that institutional 
practices of developmental state have been deeply embedded in the political and economic 
system of Korea.  
    During the 1997 crisis, the "basic institutional frameworks for a comprehensive welfare 
state were firmly established in Korea". All occupational groups are generally covered by a 
unified social insurance in Korea, except for the public pensions. (Kim Yeon Myung 2006, 
3).  
     Figure 4 well describes the dynamics of welfare production regime of Korea during 
the industrialization period that shows the characteristics of developmental productivist 
welfare regime.  
     Ironically, such transition was also because IMF not only asked for labor flexibility, 
but also recommended enlargement of unemployment insurance, and programs of job 
placement/training for helping dismissed workers find more productive jobs (Kitt 2003). 
 
 
                                                          
20) For example, In his discussion of the National Pension Program, Kim (2009, 10) comments that "the enactment of 
the scheme was clearly driven by the economic purpose to mobilize national capital required for the development of heavy 
and chemical industries". 
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Figure 4. Welfare production regime in Korea during industrialization 
 
Source: Lee, Seung-yoon (2011, 69) 
      The overall goal of the welfare state was to increase the flexibility of labor market 
while protecting workers who lost their jobs during restructuring or reform processes 
necessitated by economic downturns. Accordingly, Korean Governments pursued this goal 
in responding to the crisis, and tried to implement policies for achieving economic reforms, 
social development, and political democratization at the same time, which can be referred to 
as the "Productive Welfare" (Chan 2006, 12). 
 
IV. Current Status 
A. Level of Flexicurity 
     Vandenberg (2008, iii) conducted a survey of flexicurity condition of 6 Asian 
countries, based on the level of EPL (employment protection legislation), PLMP (passive 
labor market policies) and ALMP,21 and concluded that Korea has made the transition into 
                                                          
21) For the components of this flexicurity system, see Appendix F 
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flexicurity because it reduced restrictions on layoffs, and introduced unemployment 
insurance and ALMP.  
      He evaluated that the level of EPL in Korea is at a medium level, while those of 
PLMP and ALMP are at a high level (Vandenberg 2008, 3). OECD (2012b) also confirms 
that the Korean level of EPL is at a medium level (See Figure 5). 
Figure 5. Rigidity of employment protection legislation 
  
Source: OECD 2010b Economic Policy Reform 
 
     EPL level was evaluated from the analysis of 1) notice period for retrenchment (30 
days), 2) administrative authorization for retrenchment (no authorization but notice is 
needed), and 3) non-regular employment condition (non-regular employment is partially 
protected). Table 6 summarizes key points of non-regular employment legislation. 
Table 6. Non-regular employment legislation in Korea 
Fixed-term 
(engaged directly by the employer) 
labor contracting 
(contractor employs workers for work  
in another business) 
Law Key provisions Law Key provisions 
Act Concerning the 
Protection of Fixed-
Term and Part-Time 
Employees, 2007 
combined maximum length 
is 2 years, regardless of 
number of renewals, 
thereafter must be offered 
regular work if s/he is to be 
retained 
Act Relating to the 
Protection of 
Dispatched 
Employees, 1998 
period of service is limited to 
one year, but it can be 
renewed once for a year; final 
employer is liable to pay 
wages if contractor fails to do 
so 
Source: Vandenberg (2008, 18)  
     PLMP was analyzed by 1) unemployment insurance system, 2) severance pay, and 3) 
gratuity pay.  
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     In terms of unemployment insurance, Korea has a rather generous scheme. Korea 
initiated the Employment Insurance Program in 1995 along with two other programs: job 
training, and employment promotion and maintenance subsidies. Its coverage has been 
expanded, and enterprises of all sizes are now covered. However, small construction 
contractors, and non-corporate businesses in such areas as farming, forestry, and fishing are 
not covered. Moreover, its compliance is still not complete (36% of total workforce was 
covered in 2006) (Vandenberg 2008, 18). 
 Table 7. Unemployment insurance in Korea 
Eligibility and benefits Contribution as % of wage 
- Contributes for minimum 6 months 
- Provides 50% of previous wages (minimum 90% of minimum wage, 
maximum 40,000 won) - 90-240 days (below age 30 receive benefits 
for a shorter period than those between 30 and 50. The longest benefits 
period is reserved for those above 50 and the disabled)  
- Employer: 0.7-1.3% 
- Worker: 0.45% 
Source: Vandenberg (2008, 19)  
     ALMP were reviewed by 1) employment (job search) service, 2) skills training, 3) 
public works, 4) promotion of self-employment, and 5) employment subsidies (Vandenberg 
2008, 27-47). 
     Korea has 1,579 employment centers (6.9 per 1 million of economically active 
population and) where employment service is provided. Priority groups/areas for skills 
training are "training for the unemployed, training in small enterprises, and training for jobs 
in social services", while the major programs include on-the-job and new recruits training 
and subsidized training (Vandenberg 2008, 31). 
     Korea utilized public-works programs extensively, especially after the crises. For 
example, during 1998-2000, the annual expenditure was U$1.4 billion (9% of total 
government expenditure), and the number of public works was 0.95 million (Vandenberg 
2008, 40). 
    Self-employment rate in Korea is high (27% as of 2006), and the support for start-ups 
is organized through a few government agencies. To encourage hiring, retention and re-
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employment, Korea has adopted a few subsidy programs such as the Employment Retention 
Subsidy, the Re-employment Subsidy, and the Subsidy for SME’s Adoption of Working 
Hour Reduction (Vandenberg 2008, 43-46). 
     However, flexicurity of the Korean labor market is not yet sufficient enough, which is 
evidenced by the policy recommendations of OECD (2012a. 28) that calls for “breaking 
down of labor market dualism by relaxing employment protection for regular workers, 
expanding the coverage of non-regular workers by the social safety net, and increasing 
training opportunities for non-regular workers to enhance their employment prospects.”  
 
B. Dynamics of labor Transitions 
     Study on the dynamics of labor transitions seems not robust. However, KLI's Jae-
ryang Nam has some literature in this field (Nam 2007; Nam et al. 2010), and this part 
draws heavily on Nam's research. 
     In his study on the Korean labor market dynamics based on the KLIPS (Korean labor 
and Income Panel Study), he analyzed such dynamics as job- separation rate, job-finding 
rate, transitional possibilities, and wage gaps with regard to transitions (Nam 2007). 
Table 8. Job-separation and job-finding rate22 
 
Source: Nam (2007, 5)  
     Table 8 shows job-separation and job-finding rates. The job separation rate is high and 
the job finding rate is low in 1998 and 1999, compared to 2000-01, which suggests that the 
financial crisis in 1998 caused the unemployment rate to rise. 
                                                          
22) The reason job separation rate has a small value whereas the job finding rate has a big value is that the former is 
based on a large number of the employed and the latter is based on a small number of the unemployed. 
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     Looking into job-separation and job-finding rate by age groups, we can find some 
important implications. 
Table 9. Job-separation rate by age groups 
 
Note: youth, 15-29; primary labor force, 30-54; the aged, 55-  
Source: Nam (2007, 6)  
 
Table 10. Job-finding rate by age groups 
Note: youth, 15-29; primary labor force, 30-54; the aged, 55-  
Source: Nam (2007, 6) 
 
     From Table 9 and Table 10, we can find that the job-separation of the youths is high; 
2.3 times that of the primary labor force, and the job-finding rate of the aged is low: 0.7 of 
the primary labor force. The facts imply that measures should be focused on helping the 
youth find and adapt to the right jobs, and creating jobs for the aged and informing them of 
such jobs. 
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Table 11. Transition rates between employment states 
 
Source: Nam (2007, 27) 
     Table 11 shows the transition rates between 5 employment statuses. The first data cell, 
for example, means that 73 persons out of 100 regular workers moved between regular jobs 
in the period of 2002-03. 
Table 12 shows the numbers and transition rates with regard to transitions from or to 
non-regular jobs. The job condition types are denoted by numbers; namely, 1) regular, 2) 
non-regular, 3) non-wage, 4) unemployment, and 5) non-labor. For example, the first data 
under 2002-03 column means that 953,000 persons (and 13.2 persons per 100) moved from 
regular jobs to non-regular jobs.  
     One of the noticeable points is that the number of persons who went through 
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transitions from or to non-regular jobs is huge, annual average being 4.55 million transitions. 
Including transitions between all types of job conditions, the number still gets bigger. 
Nam (2007, 17-18) also reviewed dynamics of wage in relation to transitions, and the 
result is summarized in Table 13. Another point Nam discusses is the wage gap between 
regular and non-regular workers. Table 14 shows that wages of non-regular workers were 
lower than those of regular workers from 2002 to 2006 without a single exception, and the 
wage gaps between the two groups have widened over time.  
Table 12. Transitions from/to non-regular jobs 
(Unit: 1,000 persons, %)     
  
Note: 1 regular work, 2 non-regular work, 3 non-wage earning, 4 unemployment and  
      5 non-labor forces 
Source: Nam (2007, 9)  
Considering the number of Korean labor force, a huge number of people experience 
transitions of job types and wage levels. This observation, in special, calls for more attention 
on the importance of flexicurity, TLM and ALMP. 
However, the gap does not reflect working hours that have significant influences on 
wage determination. Hourly wages show smaller gaps between regular and non-regular jobs 
(Table 15). 
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Table 13. Dynamic changes in wage in accordance with transitions 
 
Source: Nam (2007, 17)  
 
Table 14. Average monthly wages of regular and non-regular workers 
  
Source: Nam (2007, 18)  
 
Currently, in the labor market studies, “this kind of transitions matrices is still 
underdeveloped. For lifelong guidance, it would be helpful to have such matrices on a 
regular basis, broken down by relevant socio-economic categories such as age, gender, 
education and occupations or industrial areas” (Schmid 2009, 18). 
Table 15. Average hourly wages of regular and non-regular workers 
 
Source: Nam (2007, 18)  
 31 
 
 
C. ALMP and PES 
     The Employment Insurance Law went into effect on July 1, 1995, and the 
unemployment benefits, which required a minimum one-year contribution by the insured, 
became effective on July 1, 1996 (Yoo et al. 2002, 288).23 For the past 16 years, the system 
have been expanded in terms of the applicable employers, eligibility, benefit amount and 
period (see Table 16). 
Table 16. Expansion of EIS  
Applicable employers 
(unemployment 
benefit) 
30 or more employees → 10 (Jan 1998) → 5 (Mar 1998) → 1(Oct 1998) 
Maximum amount of 
job-search benefit 30,000 won per day (Jul 1999) → 35,000 (Jan 2001) → 40,000 (Jan 2006) 
Minimum amount of 
job-search benefit 
Not specified → 70% of minimum wage (Mar 1998) → 90% of minimum wage 
(Jan 2000) 
Days of job-search 
benefit 30-210 days → 60-210 (Mar 1998) → 90-240 (Jan 2000)  
Minimum pay-in 
period 
12 months or longer within 18 months before unemployment → 180 days or longer 
(Apr 2000) 
Applicable employers 
(Employment security, 
vocational ability 
development program) 
70 or more employees → 50 (Jan 1998) → 1 (Oct 1998) 
 
* From Jan 1, 2006 self-employment worker having 0-4 employees can optionally 
subscribe to this program  
Source: MOEL (2011, 588) 
 
In addition, spending in job-skills development has much increased (Table 17). While 
the number of employment benefit recipients has been increasing, however, the extent of 
training for re-employment of unemployed has not increased at all (Table 18).  
Table 17. Fiscal spending in job-skills development  
(Unit: billion won) 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total 858 975 1,158 1,397 1,449 1,535 
Employment insurance fund 642 727 927 1,141 1,279 1,208 
General budget 236 248 231 257 271 327 
Source: MOEL (2011) 
 
                                                          
23) For the structure of the Korean employment insurance system, see Appendix G. 
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     To make matters worse for the public employment service (PES), job-searching route 
of unemployed workers are: Internet and etc., 36.4%; friends, family and relatives, 27.3%; 
ads in media, 16.3%; other personal connection 7.7%; in person 5.3%; school bulletins etc., 
2.4%; prepare for self-employment 2.4%; public job centers 1.9% (KLI 2010, 88).  
Table 18. Training for the re-employment of the employed 
(Unit: 1000 persons, million won, %) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Employment 
rate 4.4 4.0 3.3 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.2 3.2 3.6 3.7 
No. of 
unemployment 
benefit 
recipients 
332.7 428.2 416.0 502.2 707.4 812.8 943.5 1,009.2 1,162.5 1,528.4 1,336.4 
No. of 
 trainees 
120.3 104.6 88.4 57.7 53.7 64.2 53.6 65.2 70.6 88.1 26.1 
(8.8) (6.0) (4.8) (3.3) (2.6) (2.5) (1.8) (1.8) (1.7) (1.8) (0.6) 
Amount of 
support 
215.5 152.5 152.0 132.0 124.2 136.8 128.5 152.6 160.9 249.7 234.9 
(53.3) (39.4) (38.7) (33.8) (23.7) (24.0) (17.5) (17.5) (17.2) (23.3) (24.5) 
Note:  
- Trainees are those who were supported through the employment insurance fund. 
- Beginning from 2004, training for women household heads is included. 
- Employment rate: until 2000 is job-searching period of 1 week, from 2000, 4 weeks. 
- ( ) are percentage of job-skills training program  
Source: KEIS (2011) 
This means that unemployed people do not have any trust in the PES provided in the form 
of job-matching. Such lack of trust seems to be reflected in the low share of the public 
employment centers in the employment service market:  Korea (5%), Germany (33%), 
Japan (23%), UK (23%), France (22%), and the Netherlands (14%) (KLI 2008, 176).  
     ALMP is divided into a wage subsidy type and an overall PES type. Of the two, the 
latter is preferable because it is effective in unemployment reduction, while the former is not 
effective and even produces adverse effects (Kim, Hyung-rae 2011, 7). Therefore, it is 
worthwhile to review the current PES of Korea. 
     The initial program of PES dated back to 1961 when the Job Security Office was 
established, but it was only after the legislation of the Employment Security Act in 1994 and 
the Employment Insurance Act in 1995 that PES in Korea has gained legal authority. 
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Nevertheless, PES has remained as perfunctory until after the 1997 crisis, when PES 
agencies started to operate substantially (Oh 2012, 6).  
     Still, the delivery system of PES was less effective than expected. The main task of 
the Job Security Centers was to provide unemployment benefits excluding vocational skill 
development, and the inter-linkages between unemployment benefits and employment 
assistance programs, such as skill/career development and job security programs, were not 
established. In addition, Job Security Centers suffered from shortage and inexperience of 
counseling staffs (Oh 2012, 9). 
     Consequently, several measures were taken to improve PES. In 2006, Employment 
Security Centers were renamed Job Supporting Centers and restructured in terms of 
organization and manpower. At the same time, the One-stop PES Delivery System was 
devised to provide unemployment benefits, job placement assistance, employment security 
program, and vocational skills development program altogether. Moreover, networking with 
local private and public institutions was developed to deliver local-customized PES. 
Furthermore, new programs and instruments24 were set up (Oh 2012, 9). 
     As of 2011, there are 81 Job Centers in Korea (71 Job centers and 10 of its branch 
centers) (Oh 2012, 15), while the main tasks of the Job Centers are employment service 
programs (such as job placement, vocational guidance, and vocational skill development for 
the unemployed), and employment insurance programs (such as unemployment benefits, 
employment security, and vocational skill development for the employed) (Oh 2012, 11).25 
     Table 19 shows the trend of number of the Job Centers and their staffing. The number 
of job-seekers per PES staff is 1,121. And the number of economically active population per 
PES staff is 8,239 (as of 2008) which is by far larger in comparison with those of Germany 
                                                          
24) Such programs included Successful Employment Package Program, Vocational Competency Development 
Accounts Program, and New Confirmation System of Unemployment. 
25) For the departments and functions of a Job Center, see Oh 2012, 17-18 
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(564), UK (436), and the USA (3,312) (Oh 2012, 25). 
Table 19. Number of Job Center staffs 
 
Source: Oh (2012, 25) 
      
V. Discussion and Issues 
A. Lack of Spending 
     Spending in ALMP has increased considerably in Korea over the period of the 2008 
crisis. It increased by 35% in Korea (OECD average 14%) during 2008-2010. Nevertheless, 
much of the increase in ALMP spending in Korea has been on direct job creation, which has 
little long-term impact on participants’ employment prospects. However, at 0.42% in 2010 
(Figure 6), ALMP spending in Korea as percent of GDP is still slightly below the OECD 
average of 0.44% (OECD 2012c, 1).  
     Figure 7 shows that the public expenditure is far smaller than those of other OECD 
countries. Accordingly, unemployment benefit is still very small (Figure 8). In view of the 
small portion of labor taxes levied on workers (Figure 9), there is an ample room for the 
government to increase revenue for expanding social spending including labor market 
policies. Table 20 and 21 also back up this conclusion. 
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Figure 6. ALMP spending in Korea and the OECD (% of GDP)  
 
 
Note: OECD is the weighted average of 28 countries (excluding Chile, Estonia, Iceland, Israel, 
Slovenia and Turkey).  
Source: OECD (2012c, 1) 
 
Table 20. Total tax revenue as percentage of GDP 
(Unit: %, as of 2008 except for Korea) 
 Korea (2010) USA Japan UK France OECD 
Tax/GDP 19.3 19.5 17.3 28.9 27.1 25.8 
Total tax revenue/GDP  25.1 26.1 28.1 35.7 43.2 34.8 
Note: Total tax revenue = (taxes + social security contributions)/GDP × 100 
Source: OECD (2010a) 
 
Table 21. Tax revenue as percentage of GDP 
 
Source: OECD (2012a) 
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Figure 7. Public expenditure on labor market programs in OECD countries  
 
Source: OECD 2004 Employment Report, re-cited in Auer (2005, 7) 
 
Figure 8. Unemployment benefits (% of previous earnings, 2009) 
 
Note: Korea=8.9%, Source: OECD (2012d) 
Figure 9. Labor taxes for a single w/o children (% of labor costs, 2011) 
 
 
Note: Korea=20.3%, Source: OECD (2012d) 
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B. Lack of Efficiency 
     Even though employment insurance coverage has expanded (Table 22), the Job 
Centers are not fulfilling ALMP functions properly. Table 23 clearly shows that rate of 
employment through public job centers is very low. 
Table 22. Employment insurance coverage expansion 
 
Source: Yoon (2008, 11) 
 
Choi and Lee (2011) conducted a study on the method for the enhancement of the 
public service through a comparative cost-efficiency analysis on the performance of Job 
Centers.  
Table 23. Job-offering, job-searching, and employment status of public Job Centers 
(Unit: persons, %)  
Year  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
No. of Job-offerings 1,008,448 1,112,341 1,225,011 1,770,987 1,742,178 
No. of Job-searchers 1,967,073 2,093,557 2,732,741 2,755,006 2,559,832 
Job-offering multiplier 0.51 0.53 0.45 0.64 0.68 
No. of employed 501,256 544,122 669,535 701,928 656,494 
Rate of employment 25.5 26 24.5 25.5 25.6 
Source: Ministry of Employment and labor, National Index Webpage 
 
Currently, in the employment service delivery system, budget and manpower is being 
wasted due to overlapping of roles among organizations. Moreover, efficient networking 
such as IT system is lacking among the central government, local governments and private 
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actors. In particular, the linkage between KEIS (which operates the Work-net, the 
government-run job-portal site) and the Job Centers is not satisfactory. In addition, 
employment services are not differentiated to meet different local needs (MOEL 2009a, 107-
110). 
 
C. Lack of Targeting, Monitoring and Evaluation 
     In analyzing Korea's reform effort in terms of labor market and social safety net after 
the 1997 crisis, OECD listed a few observations of the Korean labor market programs 
including the lack of targeting, and the need for careful monitoring and evaluation. 
Specifically, OECD (2000, 2) emphasized that it is important "to better target ALMP, 
enhance the quality of the PES staffs, and undertake rigorous evaluations of the programs." 
     With regard to targeting, due to "a general lack of targeting" in many of the programs, 
“it is unclear whether they really reach disadvantaged groups, such as unemployed workers 
not covered by the EIS (employment insurance system) and young unemployed workers”. 
Subsidies to SMEs, which are the largest in terms of government spending on ALMP, should 
be especially well targeted (OECD, 2000, 5). 
     Ji (2011) points out that the Korean employment services are dispersed into such 
services as employment insurance, employment support and job training, and that the 
linkage between these services is not sufficient. Accordingly, overall services targeted on 
individual situations are not fully provided.  
     Monitoring systems are important for implementing and following up on measures, 
and are absolutely necessary for efficient labor market administration. Monitoring is 
required on data of expenditure/participation and labor market information in general. While 
monitoring functions are located usually with PES, they are not enough to assess overall 
(macro) impact. Especially, benchmarking and feedback are important in monitoring (Auer 
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2005, 10). 
     Evaluation is another important factor. It is needed to assess overall micro and macro 
impact to assess effects on labor market: integration effect and earnings effect. There are 
different methods of evaluation: aggregate impact, non experimental, quasi experimental, 
experimental, cost/benefit, qualitative assessments; program vs. target evaluation; cross 
section or longitudinal. However, as complex techniques are costly, simple evaluation 
techniques and simple cost/benefit analysis (monitoring) are more appropriate. In addition, 
third-party evaluators are preferable because of non partisan views (Auer 2005, 11). 
     Pierre (1999, 30-31) suggested "a framework for active labor market policy 
evaluation", and presented the following general principles regarding monitoring and 
evaluation: 
1) A target group approach seems appropriate. 
2) The determination of evaluation strategies seems preferable early in the policy 
making process, in co-operation with the relevant agents. 
3) The usefulness of evaluation studies is enhanced when their results are used in 
policy making. 
4) Monitoring can be used to rapidly give indications of the success of a program 
through comparisons of the performance of the agencies implementing it. 
5) Transparency is necessary to sell new policies to the taxpayers. 
6) The evaluation should not only consider the impacts of the program but also its 
implementation and formation. 
7) As many of the impacts as possible need to be evaluated. 
8) A combination of evaluation techniques should be used. 
9) In order to improve the quality of the results, data from various sources can be used. 
 
     While monitoring and evaluation is this important, the Korean labor market does not 
have a proper monitoring and evaluation system.  
     With regard to public employment services, there have been a few efforts to establish 
evaluation systems. For instance, the Employment Service Evaluation Center was founded 
in the KEIS (Korea Employment Information Service) in 2006 for the improvement of 
employment services by continuous assessment, monitoring, quality certification, and skill 
development. However, the Center's function is limited around employment service, not 
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around overall labor policies. On top of that, it was as late as in 2011 that the Centre 
constructed the PMS (performance management system) for employment services, which 
provides overall management of performance indicators for employment services only (Oh 
2012, 50). 
     When it comes to evaluation of Job Centers, which are at the core of PES, the Job 
Centers are not performing satisfactorily. Since 2009, simple and absolute standards have 
been utilized, while the main performance evaluation criterion is job placement assistance. 
Currently, the performance evaluation score of the Job Centers is very poor at 700 (52%) 
points out of 1,350 as of 2011. In addition, the evaluation of the Job Centers posed several 
problems as follows (Oh 2012, 28-29): 
1) It neither considered local specificity nor generated any positive, proactive, and 
creative motivation for working.  
2) Only quantitative indicators were adopted. 
3) It did not take account of linkage with other regional institutions or their resources. 
4) There were a few concerns about how to use the evaluation other than 
performance ranking.  
 
     Regarding the employment insurance program, Korea has focused on partial, and 
short-term measures against problems occurred during its implementation, and there has 
been lack of institutional tools for comprehensive and regular monitoring and evaluation of 
employment insurance program (MOEL 2009b, 3-4). 
     According to official replies of a few public organizations sent to me in response to 
my inquiry about whether Korea has a well-organized monitoring and evaluation system of 
ALMP, there is no system that monitors and evaluates overall performance of ALMP in 
Korea, except for a series of in-depth reports on employment insurance projects and 
ordinary annual performance evaluation of government agencies with regard to their budget 
projects.26 
                                                          
26) To acquire official reply regarding the existence of monitoring and evaluation of ALMP and PES, I requested on 
August 9, 2012 for information disclosure through the government site, http://www.open.go.kr, which processes citizens' 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
     Korea has enjoyed relatively high growth and employment, while it has undergone a 
few major crises. For the past few decades, Korea has implemented remarkable labor 
reforms. 
Nevertheless, Korea is suffering from increasing inequality (Figure 10), mainly due to 
dual labor market caused by such phenomena as a large incidence of low-paid work (Figure 
11), and wage gap between manufacturing and service sectors (Figure 12). 
Figure 10. Increasing inequality in Korea 
 
Source: OECD (2012a) 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
request for the disclosure of information regarding government agencies and their activities. For the list of government 
agencies to which I sent request for information disclosure, content of my request, and replies from the agencies, see 
Appendix H.   
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Figure 11. Incidence of low-paid work 
 
1) The percentage of full-time wage earners that earn less than two-thirds of the median wage of full-
time earners. 
Source: OECD 2012a 
 
Figure 12. Wages in the service sector as a share of manufacturing 
 
Source: OECD 2012a 
     Korea’s growth potential is staggering while its population is rapidly ageing. To 
reduce the impact of such population ageing such policies should be implemented as solving 
the labor mismatch problem, activating under-utilized segments of the population such as 
the female, the youth, and the old, and promoting productivity through education and 
training.  
     In the Korean labor market, there has been path dependency on the legacy of 
“developmental statism”, which took its changed form as “developmental welfarism”. 
Consequently, its post-crisis neo-liberal reforms and adjustment process have not been 
completely free from such legacy, and its effectiveness has been questioned. The process 
gave rise to the importance of state capacity (Erdogdu, 2002). 
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     To borrow the "punctuated equilibrium" concept of Krasner (1984), developmental 
statist institutions established, spread, and perpetuated themselves from the 1960s through 
mid-1980s in Korea, but then were cast aside in the labor uprising of June 1987 as a 
"punctuation" that brought about radical changes in societal, economic, and political 
atmosphere of Korea; then the neo-liberal regime set in, and the neo-liberalist institutions 
perpetuated themselves for some time. 
    At a glance, Korean labor market seems to be in a flexicurity status. Yet, from the TLM 
point of view, there is much to be done. Korea is facing the challenge of mitigating down 
increasing inequality, and keeping up economic growth, both of which are critical for 
achieving social cohesion.  
     As Inagami (1998, 2) argues, the "level of activeness of labor market policies, and the 
extent to which they perform efficiently, are entirely separate questions. It may well be that 
the labor market is highly efficient where ALMP policies are entrusted to the market or 
deregulated and the firms' roles in these areas are significant." 
     Korean labor market should establish institutions to implement ALMP efficiently. 
Expansion of social spending, prudent and effective targeting, comprehensive and regular 
monitoring/evaluation should be in place to fill holes in the social safety net. 
     From a wider point of view, the Government should pursue proactive measures to 
increase its capacity of improving employability of work force, in response to such 
challenges as rapid population ageing, labor market dualism, and shrunken growth potential, 
so that the Korean economy can overcome the tough currents of global competition, and 
informatized knowledge economy. 
 
 
 
 44 
 
 
     In some respects, to go beyond developmentalism and market fundamentalism, 
“inclusionary state activism”27 is needed to achieve “a virtuous circle of economic growth 
with reduction in poverty and inequality, and improvement in basic social indicators - in 
short, a period of inclusionary development” (Arbix and Scott 2012, 5).  
  
                                                          
27 ) This inclusionary state activism is also referred to as “new developmentalism.” Implications of “new 
developmentalism” and their applicability to the Korean economy will be saved for further study elsewhere. For the 
summary of the Ten Theses of New Developmentalism, which summarizes the essence of this concept, see Appendix I.  
 45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
  
 46 
 
APPENDICES 
Appendix A. Population ageing Index (2001-2011) 
Population unit: 1,000 
Year Total Population  (a) 
Growth  
(%) 
0-14 
years (b) 
b/a 
(%) 
15-64 years 
(c) 
c/a 
(%) 
65 - 
years (d) 
d/a 
(%) 
d/c* 
(%) 
d/b** 
(%) 
2001 47,357  0.7   9,854  21   33,925  72   3,578  8   11   36   
2002 47,622  0.6   9,747  20   34,103  72   3,772  8   11   39   
2003 47,859  0.5   9,606  20   34,285  72   3,968  8   12   41   
2004 48,039  0.4   9,446  20   34,428  72   4,166  9   12   44   
2005 48,138  0.2   9,241  19   34,530  72   4,367  9   13   47   
2006 48,372  0.5   8,989  19   34,791  72   4,592  9   13   51   
2007 48,598  0.5   8,725  18   35,046  72   4,828  10   14   55   
2008 48,949  0.7   8,489  17   35,408  72   5,052  10   14   60   
2009 49,182  0.5   8,232  17   35,694  73   5,256  11   15   64   
2010 49,410  0.5   7,975  16   35,983  73   5,452  11   15   68   
2011 49,779  0.7   7,771  16   36,353  73   5,656  11   16   73   
* Old-age support rate: (population of age 65 or older)/(population of age 15-64)*100 
** Ageing index: (population of age 65 or older)/(population of age 14 or younger)*100 
- Source: Korean Statistical Information Service 
 
Appendix B. Population and employment trend (2001-2011) 
Population unit: 1,000 
Year 
Total 
Population  
(a) 
15- 
years 
(b) 
EAP* 
(c) 
Participation 
rate 
(%) 
Employed 
(d) 
Employ-
ment 
rate 
(%) 
Un- 
employed 
(e) 
Unemploy-
ment 
rate 
(%) 
2001 47,357  36,579  22,471  61.4  21,572  59.0  899  4.0  
2002  47,622  36,963  22,921  62.0  22,169  60.1 752  3.3  
2003  47,859  37,340  22,957  61.5  22,139  59.3  818  3.6  
2004  48,039  37,717  23,417  62.1  22,557  59.8  860  3.7  
2005  48,138  38,300  23,743  62.0  22,856  59.7  887  3.7  
2006  48,372  38,762  23,978  61.9  23,151  59.7  827  3.5  
2007  48,598  39,170  24,216  61.8  23,433  59.8  783  3.2  
2008  48,949  39,598  24,347  61.5  23,577  59.5  769  3.2  
2009  49,182  40,092  24,394  60.8  23,506  58.6  889  3.6  
2010  49,410  40,590  24,748  61.0  23,829  58.7  920  3.7  
2011  49,779  41,052  25,099  61.1  24,244  59.1  855  3.4  
* EAP: Economically active population 
- Economic activity participation rate = (c)/(a)×100 
- Employment rate = (d)/(b)×100 
- Unemployment rate = (e)/(c)×100 
- Source: Korean Statistical Information Service  
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Appendix C. Development of welfare system, economy and politics in Korea 
 
Source: Yoon (2008, 3) 
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Appendix D. Tripartite Agreement of 1998: Core Contents 
 
Source: Lee and Lee (2002, 42) 
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Appendix E. Social insurance and welfare system in Korea 
 
Source: Yoon (2008, 4) 
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Appendix F. Components of flexicurity system 
 
Source: Vandenberg (2008, 6)  
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Appendix G. Structure of the Korean employment insurance system 
 
Source: Yoo et al. (2002, 292) 
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Appendix H. Request for information disclosure regarding ALMP and PES 
Agencies to which 
request was sent  MOEL, KLI, and KEIS 
Content of my request 
(dated Aug 9, 2012) 
     1. Are there monitoring and evaluation system of ALMP 
and PES in Korea? 
     2. If yes, what are their chronicles, achievements, current 
status (including budget), problem, and solutions? 
     3. If not, is there monitoring and evaluation system of 
overall labor market policies? 
     4. If yes, what are their chronicles, achievements, current 
status (including budget), problem, and solutions? 
Summary 
of replies 
from the 
agencies 
 
(date of 
reply) 
MOEL 
(Sep 4, 
2012) 
     MOEL conducts governmental operation evaluation (self 
evaluation and specific evaluation) and performance evaluation 
on budget-spending projects based on the Basic Law regarding 
Governmental Operation Evaluation, and the National Fiscal 
Law. And it conducts operation progress performance evaluation 
on its local offices. 
     However, it does not conduct separate evaluation on 
ALMP and PES. 
KEIS 
(Sep 16, 
2012) 
     There exists a performance management system on PES.  
     Performance evaluation of Job Centers is part of MOEL’s 
evaluation on local labor offices and its Brach offices.  
     In 2009, evaluation criteria for Job Centers was simplified 
focusing on their performance of employment provision, and 
absolute evaluation indicators were used. 
     Performance evaluation of Job Centers was focused on 
employment support, and its evaluation indicators comprised of 
employment provision performance in such areas as general job-
seekers, unemployment insurance beneficiaries, vacant job 
takers, vulnerable class, low-income unemployment insurance 
beneficiaries package, employment success package and youth 
new start, in-depth counseling. 
     The Employment Service Evaluation Center was 
established in KEIS for the purpose of enhancing employment 
service through continuous evaluation, monitoring, certification 
and skills development. The Center constructed Employment 
Service Performance Management System in 2011 which 
provides overall management of PES performance evaluation 
indicators.   
KLI (Sep 
21, 2012) 
     ALMP system of Korea is composed of Employment 
Insurance System at its center, job creation policies of 
government agencies, job training system which centers around 
job training account scheme, and PES which centers on Job 
Centers. 
     All these systems are to be evaluated in every fiscal year: 
General budget projects undergo MOSF’s Fiscal Projects 
Autonomous Evaluation by Agency (performance management 
system), and funded projects (e.g., Employment Insurance 
Fund) submit their fund operation result reports to the National 
Assembly for annual evaluation. 
Note: MOEL = Ministry of Employment and Labor, KLI = Korea Labor Institute, KEIS = Korea 
Employment Information Service, MOSF = Ministry of Strategy and Finance. 
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Appendix I. Summary of the Ten Theses on New Developmentalism 
 
1. "Economic development is a structural process of utilizing all available domestic resources."  
2. "The state has a strategic role in providing the appropriate institutional framework to support 
this structural process." 
3. "Economic development requires a national development strategy which seizes global 
opportunities, ... mitigates barriers to innovation, ... assures financial stability, and creates 
investment opportunities to private entrepreneurs."  
4. "The demand side is where the major growth bottlenecks unfold." 
5. "The tendency of wages to increase more slowly than productivity growth is due to the 
existence of an abundant supply of labor and of the political economy of labor markets. ... A 
legal minimum wage, cash transfers to the poor, and ... a government guarantee to provide 
employment at a living wage could be used." 
6. "The tendency to cyclical overvaluation of the exchange rate in developing countries has been 
due to both the excessive reliance on external savings in the form of foreign capital flows 
and the Dutch disease."  
7. "Dutch disease may be characterized as a permanent overvaluation of the national currency 
due to Ricardian rents originated from the export of commodities based on natural resources 
or exports based on ultra cheap labor."  
8. "Economic development should be financed essentially with domestic savings."  
9. "The government must ensure a stable long term relation between the public debt and GDP 
and a real exchange rate that takes account of the need to counter the adverse effects on the 
manufacturing industry of Dutch disease."  
10. "To achieve long term development, economic policies should pursue full employment as its 
primary goal, while assuring price and financial stability."  
Source: http://www.tenthesesonnewdevelopmentalism.org/ 
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